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I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellee raises several new issues in its brief filed with this Court on August 
28, 2006. The Appellee contends that (1) Mr. IngersoU had a duty to marshal the facts in 
its opening brief, and failed to do so; and (2) contends that Mr. Ingersoll's due process 
rights were not violated because his entire case was centered upon proving the existence 
of a contract. (Aplee Br. at 6, 11). The Appellee is incorrect in both of its assertions. Mr. 
Ingersol was not required to marshal the evidence with respect to the finding that a 
contract did not exist; since a conclusion as to whether a contract exists is a question of 
law, not fact. Moreover, it is absurd to speak of marshaling the evidence regarding what 
was not an issue at trial. Were Mr. Ingersol given proper notice that the existence of the 
contract was in issue, he would have presented his case differently and more evidence of 
the existence of a contract would have been available to marshal. Mr. Ingersol's case was 
not centered upon proving the existence of a contract. The parties agreed that a contract 
existed; that issue was never presented to the Court. The dispute presented to the trial 
court was whether there had been a breach of the contract. Mr. Ingersol was not given 
notice that "whether a contract existed was an issue." 
II. ARGUMENT 
a. Correct Standard of Review: Correction of Error 
Mr. IngersoU contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that a contract 
did not exist between the parties. Mr. Ingersol! presented two issues for review by this 
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Court. (1) Did the trial court err when it concluded that there was no contract between the 
Appellant and the Appellee when both parties testified that there had been a contract? (2) 
Did the trial court err in finding that there was no contract when that issue was not in 
contention and was not disputed by the parties? Mr. Ingersoll stated that this Court 
should review the issues under the clearly erroneous standard; however, that was an 
incorrect standard. On further analysis in response to appellees assertions, Mr. Ingersol 
corrects his earlier contention about the standard of review. 
The first issue surrounds the trial court's conclusion that a contract did not exist. 
The trial court's conclusion that a contract did not exist is a conclusion of law which 
should be reviewed under the correction of error standard. In Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. 
v. Ouintex, where the sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in ruling that 
no contract existed between the parties, this Court stated: "Whether a contract exists 
between parties is a question of law; therefore, we review the trial court's conclusion of 
law under a correction of error standard." Id, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
citing. Bailey v. Call 767 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Therefore, the Court 
should review the trial court's conclusion that a contract did not exist between the parties 
under a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the trial court. 
The second issue centers on the trial court's finding of a question of law that was 
not raised in the pleadings. A finding made by the trial court on an issue that is not in the 
pleadings is a conclusion of law which should be reviewed for correctness, giving no 
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deference to the trial court's ruling. This Court stated in Cowley v. Porter, that a "claim 
that the trial court erred in entering judgment... on a theory not raised by the pleadings 
involves a conclusion of law that we review under a correction-of-error standard." Id., 
127 P.3d 1224, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). Therefore, this Court should review the trial 
courts ruling on an issue not tried before the court under the correction of error standard, 
giving no deference to the trial court's ruling. 
b. Conduct of the Parties Shows the Existence of a Contract 
Mr. Ingersoll argued in his brief that a contract between the parties is evidenced 
from the testimony and conduct of the parties. To support his contention that a contract 
can be formed by the conduct of the parties, Mr. Ingersoll cited to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 70A-2-204, which states that "a contract for the sale of goods may be made in any 
manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes 
the existence of such a contract." Mr. Ingersoll also pointed this Court to Osguthorpe v. 
Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., which stands for the proposition that a contract can be 
formed as a result of either a writing, words, or conduct. Id., 456 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th 
Cir. 1972). The Appellee argues that Mr. Ingersoll's reliance upon this case is misplaced 
because Osguthorpe was a jury trial which was reviewed by the Tenth Circuit to 
determine whether the instructions given to the jury was correct. (Aplee. Br. at 10). Such 
a case is ideal when determining a question of law since jury instructions are reviewed 
under a standard of correctness. State v. Pearson, 985 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1999). The Tenth Circuit's declaration of the legal doctrine regarding the formation of a 
contract is extremely helpful. Further, the case is significant because it interprets Utah 
Code Ann. Section 70A-2-204 to mean that contracting parties may enter into a contract 
orally or by their conduct. Osguthorpe at 1000. The conduct of the parties in the case 
before this court shows that it was the intent of the parties to be bound by the agreement 
reached on May 15, 2002. (App. Br. at 8,9). 
c. Mr. IngersoIPs Case was not Dependent upon Proving the Existence of a 
Contract 
The Appellee argues that Mr. Ingersoll's due process of law was not violated by 
the trial courts conclusion because his case was dependant upon proving the existence of 
a contract. The Appellee is wrong. On March 26, 2003, Mr. Ingersoll answered the 
complaint filed by Appellee and brought a counterclaim for breach of contract. Mr. 
Ingersoll's breach of contract claim was not dependent upon proving the existence of a 
contract because the parties both agreed that a contract existed. Rather, Mr. Ingersoll's 
case was dependant upon showing that the Appellee had received proper consideration 
for the contract and the Appellee had breached its obligations under the contract. 
The Appellee attempts to support its contention that the issue of the existence of a 
contract was always at issue by claiming that in answering Mr. Ingersoll's complaint, it 
denied the existence of a contract. (Aplee. Br. at 12). Even if such a statement is true, 
Appellee's denial was made at the beginning of the case. As the case progressed, the 
Appellee changed its tune. As manifested in its Proposed Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law, the basis for its claim that it was owed $9,006.25 by Appellant was 
that it had entered into a contract for goods and services. (A-l's Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law ]|5). It further proposed that an agreement had been 
reached between the parties which was: 
That part of the agreement was that Defendant would provide a certain 
motor vehicle valued at $14,500.00 to one Mark Powell, Mark Powell 
would deliver motor vehicle and three roll-off containers valued at 
$14,500.00 to Plaintiff and Defendant would be entitled to credit for the 
value of the vehicle he provided to Powell in the amount of $14,500, 
from Plaintiff. The agreement also provided that Defendant would pay 
Plaintiff 25% of the value of services rendered to Defendant, in cash, ten 
days following the end of the month in which the services were rendered 
and the remaining 75% of the value of the services would be applied 
towards the $14,500.00 credit. 
(A-l Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law |^6). It is evident from 
Appellee's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, submitted before trial, 
that it believed that a contract existed between the parties. 
In fact, the Appellee has never argued that a contract did not exist between the 
parties. The basis of Appellee's defense was that Mr. IngersoU breached the contract and 
therefore it was void. The Appellee makes this clear in its brief to this Court when it 
quotes its counsel in his opening statement saying "So that agreement, at least in the eyes 
of the plaintiff, was void. It wasn't followed through; it was breached." (R. at 88). By 
the Appellee's own admission in its brief, a contract existed between the parties, and the 
question it presented to the trial court was whether that contract was breached or voided. 
Contrary to Appellee's contention, the trial court did not answer the question of 
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law presented by the Appellee; rather than finding that the contract had been breached or 
voided, it found that a contract did not exist between the parties. Mr. Ingersoll's right to 
due process of law was violated because the trial court made a finding on a question of 
law which was not in contention between the parties. Had notice been given to Mr. 
Ingersoll, he would have had the opportunity to present evidence to prove the existence of 
a contract between the parties. 
d. Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does not Allow a Court to Make a 
Finding on a Question of Law that has not been Tried 
The Appellee argues that even if it had not presented the question of the existence 
of a contract, the relief granted by the trial court was proper under Rule 54, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (Aplee. Br. at 12,13). Rule 54 provides that "every final judgment shall 
grant the relief to which the part in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." The Appellee is incorrect in its assertion, 
Rule 54 is limited in scope to those issues which are presented to the court, and supported 
by evidence. The Utah Supreme Court has stated "although Rule 54(c)(1) permits relief 
on grounds not pleaded, that rule does not go so far as to authorize the granting of relief 
on issues neither raised nor tried." Fair v. Brinkerhoff 829 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992); quoting. Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns. Inc.. 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 
1984). The question regarding the existence of a contract was never tried. 
As is apparent in the Appellee's brief, the issue of whether or not a contract 
existed was never raised nor tried before the trial court. An issue is tried when a party has 
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had a fair opportunity to present and have determined an issue of law or fact. Cf, 
D'Aston v. Aston. 844 P.2d 345, 350 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The question of law before 
the trial court was whether the parties breached the terms of the agreement entered into. 
Only evidence surrounding the obligations and performances of the parties was presented 
to the trial court to show either that the contract had been breached. Evidence 
surrounding the question of law of whether a contract existed was not presented to the 
court, and therefore the issue was not tried. Mr. Ingersoll was never given the 
opportunity to present a case on the question of law of whether a contract existed. Since 
Mr. Ingersoll was never given that opportunity, the question of whether a contract existed 
between the parties has not been tried, and a finding on that question of law is error on the 
part of the trial court. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The issues raised before this Court by Mr. Ingersoll are questions of law and 
therefore should be reviewed under the correction of error standard. Upon review of the 
record before the trial court, it is evident that the parties agreed that they had entered into 
a contract. It is error for the trial court to make a conclusion of law on an issue which 
was agreed to by the parties. Further, the question of law asking whether a contract 
existed was not in dispute by the parties and therefore never presented for determination 
by the trial court. Therefore, since the question was never tried before the trial court, Mr. 
Ingersoll's due process of law was violated when the trial court made a determination on 
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the issue. For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ingersoll requests that the trial court's 
determination that a contract did not exist between the parties be reversed to find in favor 
of Mr. Ingersoll in the amount of the unused credit of $6,193.00. 
DATED this JL of October, 2006. 
ATKIN LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
Blake S.Atkin' 
William O. Kimball 
Brennan H. Moss 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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